

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ACDE-00 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 3669

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SPC /SHIRTSLEEVES/ MEETINGS ON OPTION III
JUNE 8 AND 9, 1975

REF: A) STATE 146646; B) USNATO 3595 DTG 051033Z JULY 75;
C) STATE 159769; D) STATE 158837; E) STATE 135536

SUMMARY: SPC MET IN /SHIRTSLEEVES SESSION/ AFTERNOON OF JULY 8
AND MORNING OF JULY 9 AND DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF
OPTION III: DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED; OTHER EQUIP-
MENT (PARTICULARLY FROGS AND SCUDS) IN THE TANK ARMY, DEFINITION
OF TANKS TO BE REDUCED, LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET TANKS, AND HOW TO
LIMIT NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS TO PHASE I. ON MODELS DEFINITION OF
AIRCRAFT AND OF TANKS, SPC APPEARED TO MOVE TOWARDS SOME CON-
SENSUS IN FAVOR OF US POSITION, BUT FRG REP (HOYNCK) OBJECTED
THAT AS HIS AUTHORITIES MIGHT HAVE FURHTER QUESTIONS, IT WOULD
BE PREMATURE TO ATTEMPT TO DRAFT AN AGREED POSITION. CHAIRMAN
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(PABSCH) SUGGESTED A DISCUSSION OF AIR MANPOWER ISSUES, BUT
UK REP FELT THIS SHOULD AWAIT CONCLUSION OF STUDIES BY MBFR
WORKING GROUP ON SUBCEILINGS. NO DATE WAS SET FOR ANOTHER SUCH
MEETING. END SUMMAYR.

1. THESE SESSIONS WERE ORIGINALLY REQUESTED BY I REP (LOGAN) AS A FORUM IN WHICH EXPERTS FROM CAPTALS COULD ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THE UK POSITION. ONLY UK, BELGIUM, AND NETHERLANDS SENT MILITARY EXPERTS FROM CAPTTALS ALTHOUGH CANADA, DENMARK, FRG, AND NORWAY SENT THE REPS WHO NORMALLY REPRESENT THEIR MISSIONS AT MBFR WORKING GROUP MEETINGS. FRANCE, ITALY, AND TURKEY WERE REPRESENTED BY DELEGATION POLITICAL OFFICERS OF WHICH ONLY THE ITALINA SPOKE, WHILE ICELAND, GREECE, LUXEMBOURG, AND PORTUGAL DID NOT ATTEND. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON TANK LIMITATIONS, THE MEETINGS TOOK THE FORM OF QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS RAISED BY ALLIES, AND RESPONSES FROM US REP (PEREZ) BACKED BY WASHINGTON EXPERTS. FRG EXPLICITLY AND UK IMPLICITLY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE QUESTIONS IN THE FUTURE. THE SPC WAS FAR FROM CONSENSUS ON THE RELATED ISSUES OF WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY AND LIMITATIONS ON SOVIT TANKS. THE REPORT WHICH FOLLOWS IS ARRANGED BY TOPIC RATHER THAN CHRONOLOGICALLY.

2. DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED. US REP MADE A BRIEF INITIAL PRESENTATION IN WHICH HE DREW UPON SUBSTANCE OF REF A, PARA 5 FF AND FOCUSSED UPON THE TWO ISSUES WHICH HAD LED TO HEAVIEST QUESTIONING IN JULY 3 SESSION (REF B, PARAS 2 AND 3): THE UNIVERSAL APPLICABILITY OF THE MODELS APPROACH, AND THE VERIFIABILITY OF "/NUCLEAR-CAPABLE" AIRCRAFT BY THE MODELS DEFINITION. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) ASKED WHETHER WE KNEW OF ANY FUTURE AIRCRAFT FOR WHICH NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AND NON-NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS WOULD BE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM OUTSIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT. US REP DREW ON REF A, PARA 5 FF TO SAY THAT WE ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTIES. CANADIAN REP (CMDR BECKETT) NOTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES AGREE WITH US, IF ONLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE MODELS APPROACH. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF THE MODELS APPROACH WERE AT SOME POINT USED TO LIMIT SOVIET AIRCRAFT, WE COULD VERIFY WHICH AIRCRAFT WERE IN FACT NUCLEAR-CAPABLE. US REP REPLIED THAT WHILE SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY A NUCLEAR WEAPON ON A PLANE WHICH WE THOUGHT WAS NON-NUCLEAR-CAPABLE, MILITARILY USEFUL NUCLEER
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CAPABILITY WOULD LEAD TO ACTIVITIES WE COULD DETECT. MOREOVER, SINCE THE SOVIETS COULD ALWAYS BRING IN MORE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FROM THE USSR ITSELF IN A MATTER OF HOURS, THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO CHEAT. ITALIAN REP (SFARA) SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET ABILITY TO VERIFY US ADHERENCE TO A CEILING ON NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY NATIONAL MEANS WOULD GIVE EAST A BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT WEST COULD VERIFY SOVIET REDUCTIONS WITHOUT NEGOTIATED INSPECTION. US REP NOTED THAT SOVIETS WERE UNLIKELY TO RAISE VERIFICATION ISSUE AND THAT, IF THEY DID SO AT ALL, THIS COULD BE CACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST. UK REP (BAILES) OBSERVED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE DISAGREEMENT: ALL FELT THAT HE SOVIETS WOULD NOTNEED INSPECTION TO VERIFY OPTION III, AND THAT THIS SHOULD NOT STOP THE ALLIES

FROM DEMANDING WHATEVER INSPECTION WE FEEL WE NEED FROM THE EAST. CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN ALLIED AGREEMENT BELONGED IN A VERIFICATION STUDY, NOT IN OPTION III.

3. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHETHER UK SILENCE MEANT UK AGREED WITH US THAT MODELS DEFINITION WAS BEST. UK REP, VISIBLY EMBARRASSED, SAID THAT UK HAD NO ALTERNATIVE IT PREFERRED, BUT MIGHT RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. CHAIRMAN ASKED WHETHER THE SPC NOW AGREED IN SUBSTANCE ON THE MODELS APPROACH. FRG REP (HOYNCK) OBJECTED THAT WHILE THERE WERE NO MORE QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME, HIS AUTHORITIES MIGHT COME UP WITH SOME. HE CONSIDERED IT PREMATURE TO ASSUME THAT THE SPC WAS IN AGREEMENT. HE NOTED THAT MODELS APPROACH IMPLIED TWO QUESTIONS WHICH THE US HAD NOT YET ANSWERED: THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WHICH PARA 32 OF THE US PAPER SAID WOULD BE NEEDED TO REGISTER WHETHER NEW MODELS WERE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE, AND WHETHER THE US WOULD LIST INITIALLY ALL ITS NUCLEAR CAPABLE MODELS OR JUST THOSE IN THE NGA. US REP REPLIED THAT INITIAL LIST WOULD INCLUDE ONLY MODELS THEN IN THE NGA. BELGIAN REP OBSERVED THAT BELGIUM WAS NOT YET SATISFIED THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS, AND SO COULD NOT ACCEPT AT THIS TIME MODELS APPROACH TO LIMITING THEM.

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4. OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE TANK ARMY, PARTICULARLY FROGS AND SCUDS. US REP MADE BRIEF INITIAL PRESENTATION, INCLUDING VERBATIM PARA 1 OF REF C. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE US,

IN ORDER TO RETAIN ITS OWN FLEXIBILITY, COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE GOAL OF WITHDRAWING A TANK ARMY NECESSARILY REQUIRED WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION OF ALL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH A TANK ARMY, WHICH IS WHY DECISIONS ARE REQUIRED ON SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS OF FROGS AND SCUDS (WHICH THE US OPPOSES) AND SOVIET TANKS (WHICH THE US FAVORS). BELGIAN REP ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE US WOULD ACCEPT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 MEN, 1,700 TANKS, AND NOTHING ELSE. US REP REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION WAS VERY HYPOTHETICAL--WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW ALL ELEMENTS ORGANIC TO A TANK ARMY RATHER THAN SCATTER ITS COMPONENTS. NETHERLANDS REP (MEESMAN) ASKED WHETHER REQUIREMENT FOR SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS REPRESENTED US FALLBACK POSITION FROM PREFERRED POSITION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY. US REPEATED LANGUAGE FROM REF F PARA 1:

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"WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN MAJOR UNITS INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS. BUT WE WILL REQUIRE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ONLY OF SOVIET MANPOWER AND TANKS." MC REP (GROUP CAPTAIN SMITH) OBSERVED THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT MOVE AWAY FROM TANK ARMY CONCEPT. BELGIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT US POSITION REPRESENTED A RETREAT FROM PARA 27 OF CM(73)83, WHICH SPOKE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EQUIPMENT OF TANK ARMY. HE AGREED THAT THESIS POSITION WAS IN LINE WITH THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS AS TABLED IN VIENNA, HOWEVER, HE INSISTED THIS DISCREPANCY WILL STILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THE US POSITION, BUT WOULD HAVE TO REPORT THAT IT WOULD REPRESENT A CHANGE. UK REP ASKED WHETHER US POSITION WAS THAT ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY, BUT SEEK MENTION NOT OF TANK ARMY BUT ONLY OF MEN AND TANKS IN THE TREATY. US REPS REPLIED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO ENVISAGE CONTENT OF TREATY, BUT THAT US WOULD NOT REQUIRE THAT TREATY MENTION MORE THAN MEN AND TANKS.

5. LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET TANKS. DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT BLENDED WITH DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUS TOPIC, WITH CONSIDERABLE REPETITION. BELGIAN REP RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO HIS CONTENTION THAT MANPOWER LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT SOVIET TANKS AND WOULD AVOID A SLIPPERY SLOPE LEADING TO CONSTRAINTS ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS. US REP EMPHASIZED IN RESPONSE TO LATTER POINT THAT THE ALLIES CAN SIMPLY SAY NO AND MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION AND CITED THE FBS ISSUE IN SALT AS A CASE IN POINT THAT SOVIET DEMANDS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY REJECTED. FRG REP REMARKED THAT REDUCTIONS OF MANPOWER ALONE, IF COMBINED WITH "PLAYING" WITH MANPOWER FIGURES, COULD LEAD TO ALLIES OBTAINING VERY LITTLE FROM MBFR. HOWEVER, FRG REP MADE A STATEMENT AT THE END OF JULY 8 SESSION IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSITION THAT THE ALLIES COULD AND SHOULD SAY NO TO THE SOVIETS. BUT, HE SAID, THIS REQUIRED PRIOR ALLIED AGREEMENT ON WHERE TO SAY NO. IN PARTICULAR, AGREEMENT WOULD NEED TO BE REGISTERED IN

THE SUPPLEMENT ON TWO POINTS WHICH THE US DOD NOT WANT TO

DECIDE YET: (1) THE DEFINITION OF THE LIMITATION THAT WOULD BE IMPOSED ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE TO BE REDUCED BY THE US, AND (2) THE NATURE OF THE FOLLOW-ON PROCEDURE. FRG REP SAID HE OPPOSED TAKING A ROAD IN NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT A SECRET

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PRIOR DECISION ON WHERE THE ROAD WOULD END. OR HOW FAR DOWN THE ROAD WE WOULD GO. THIS WAS DANGEROUS, AND MORE DANGEROUS FOR COUNTRIES INSIDE THE NGA THAN FOR THE OTHERS.

6. ANOTHER SERIOUS QUESTION REGARDING TANK LIMITATIONS WAS RAISED BY DANISH (COL. KORGAN), MC, AND BELGIAN EPS: WHY, IF THE SOVIETS DID INDEED REDUCE A TANK ARMY, WOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN ADDITION TO IMPOSE A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON SOVIET TANKS? THEY SAW REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 1,700 SOVIET TANKS AS A FALL-BACK FROM POSITION THAT "ENTIRE TANK ARMY INCLUDING 1,700 TANKS" BE REDUCED. US REP POINTED OUT THAT A LIMITATION ON TANKS WAS NECESSARY IF SOVIETS WERE TO BE PREVENTED FROM A LONG-TERM PROGRAM TO RESTORE THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHOSE WITHDRAWAL WE SOUGHT. FRG REP COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS SOME MERIT IN THE CONTENTION THAT WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY MADE A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON TANKS UNNECESSARY, BUT THAT FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW IT MIGHT BE BEST TO HAVE AN EXPLICIT CEILING ON SOVIET HARDWARE, I.E., TANKS, TO BALANCE THE EXPLICIT CEILINGS THE US WOULD BE ACCEPTING ON HARDWARE, I.E., NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

7. BEGIN COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE REMAINS IN QUESTION AND ALLIES WILL ADDRESS IT FURTHER. ALLIED REPS APPEARED TO SEE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN US POSITION ON THIS ISSUE (SEEK REPEAT SEEK A WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY; REQUIRE REPEAT REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION OF MEN AND TANKS) AND OVERALL US PRINCIPLE WHICH ALLIES SUPPORT THAT NO ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED EXCEPT THOSE WHOSE REDUCTION IS EXPLICITLY BARGAINED FOR. ALLIES PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND US POSITION IN PARA 1 OF REF C, AND PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF IT:

A. ALLIES WOULD DEMAND WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION OF TANK ARMY. THE POINT OF MENTIONING 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS WOULD BE TO DEFINE THE SIZE OF THE TANK ARMY, BUT ALL ITS ELEMENTS WOULD EQUALLY BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS. (MC REP)

B. ALLIES WOULD DEMAND WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS ONLY OF 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IN ORDER TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY, BUT WE WOULD NOT DEMAND THAT THEY DO SO. (DANKSH REP) BELGIAN REP AGREED WITH THIS INTERPRETATION BUT PREFERRED SECRET

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TO OMIT THE TANKS FROM THE ALLIED DEMAND.)

C. ALLIES WOULD BEGIN WITH POSITION A, BUT WOULD FALL BACK TO POSITION B RATHER THAN ACCEPT LIMITS ON US UNITS OR FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATION. NETHERLANDS AND CANADIAN REPS)

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D. ALLIES WOULD DEMAND WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ONLY OF 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS ASSOCIATED WITH A TANK ARMY, BUT WOULD NOT IMPOSE A LIMITATION ON A TANK ARMY PER SE. (UK RE GERAHTY IN CORRIDOR.) END COMMENT.

8. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHAT LIMITATIONS THE US COULD ACCEPT ON ITS TANKS. US EXPERTS EXPLAINED THAT US NOW HAS ABOUT 2,000 TANKS IN NGA, AND WOULD WANT TO LEAVE ROOM TO RESTORE EARLIER TANK LEVEL OF ABOUT 2,700 AS WELL AS FOR MODEST INCREASES ABOVE THAT. BELGIAN REP ASKED WHY SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT CEILING ON US TANKS WITH ROOM FOR INCREASES, AND US REP REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD REFLECT THEIR REACTION TO THE OVERALL DEAL. IT WAS POINTED OUT BY MC REP AND UK WORKING GROUP REP THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE ACTUAL LEVEL OF US TANKS IN THE NGA, SINCE THE ALLIES HAVE TABLED ONLY FIGURES ON TANKS IN UNITS BUT NOT ON TANKS IN RESERVE.

9. DEFINITION OF TANKS TO BE REDUCED. US REP'S INTRODUCTORY
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COMMENTS QUOTED REF D, PARAS 2-4 ON ISSUE OF FOLLOW-ON PROBLEM. FRG REP NOTED THAT FOLLOW-ON HAD TO BE SETTLED BEFORE WE WENT AHEAD WITH OPTION III, AND US REP REPLIED THAT THE MATTER WAS UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED WHY LIST OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS SHOULD NOT BE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE, SO AS TO OFFER MAXIMUM GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER SOME NEW TANK WAS OR WAS NOT A MAIN BATTLE TANK. UK EXPERT (GERAHTY) ADDED THAT ATTEMPTING TO DEVISE A PRECISE DEFINITION OF A MAIN BATTLE TANK ALSO RAISED THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO EXCLUDE WHAT WE WANTED TO EXCLUDE (E.G. FRG TANK DESTROYERS AND UK SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY), AND US EXPERT NOTED THAT A PRECISE DEFINITION ALSO WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO DEVISE A VEHICLE WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF A MAIN BATTLE TANK BUT FALLING JUST OUTSIDE THE DEFINITION.

10. SPC HAD NO QUESTIONS REGARDING DEFINITION OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LIMITATIONS.

11. INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ONLY IN PHASE I. US REP MADE PRELIMINARY REMARKS DRAWN FROM PARA 4 OF REF C AND FROM THE ANSWER TO QUESTION #17 IN REF E. HE REITERATED THE POINT THAT ALLIES NEED NOT CONDEDE WHAT EAST DEMANDS. FRG REP THANKED US REP FOR THIS STATEMENT, AND NOTED THAT FRG HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THIS ITEM. WHAT FRG SOUGHT WAS AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE ALLIES THAT ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, (A) THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, AND (B) THAT ALLIES MUST NOT BE SHY ABOUT TELLING THIS TO THE EAST. BELGIAN REP OBSERVED THAT PARA 3 OF DRAFT GUIDANCE REJECTED FURTHER AIR AS WELL AS NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, AND THIS WAS CORRECT. HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS SKEPTICISM THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID LIMITATIONS (AS DISTINCT FROM REDUCTIONS) ON ALLIED EQUIPMENT OF TYPES REDUCED BY SUPERPOWERS. THERE WERE NO FURTHER COMMENTS OF SUBSTANCE ON THIS POINT.

12. COMMENT: WE EXPECT FURTHER QUESTIONS AND NATIONAL VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION OF TANK ARMY. APART FROM THAT, WE BELIEVE THAT LITTLE FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON THESE ISSUES UNTIL THE FRG AND UK ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER, AT THAT POINT, THE FRG AND UK WILL DESIRE FURTHER "SHIRTSLEEVES SESSIONS," FOLLOWING TRILATERALS OR WILL BE PREPARED TO TURN DIRECTLY TO DRAFTING OF PARAS 4-9 OF DRAFT GUIDANCE AND ALSO OF THE SUPPLEMENT. END COMMENT
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13. ACTION REQUESTED: THE COMPLEX OF ISSUES ARISING FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN FUTURE SPC MEETINGS. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE: (A) DO WE CARE WHICH 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS ACTUALLY ARE WITHDRAWN? (B) SHOULD FROGS AND SCUDS ACTUALLY DIWHDRAW? (C) SHOULD OTHER ELEMENTS OF A TANK ARMY ACTUALLY WITHDRAW?

(D) WHAT EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS WOULD BE PLACED ON THE SOVIETS?
(E) WHAT IMPLICIT LIMITATIONS WOULD BE PLACED ON THE SOVIETS?
(F) WHERE SHOULD WE DRAW THE LINE BETWEEN OUR INITIAL DEMAND
AND A FALL-BACK POSITION? (G) UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD
WE MOVE TO A FALL-BACK POSITION? COMMENTS AND FURTHER
GUIDANCE WOULD BE APPRECIATED. THE FRG ALSO MADE IT CLEAR
THAT THEY CANNOT AGREE TO THE MODELS APPROACH TO DEFINING
TANKS AND AIRCRAFT UNTIL THEY KNOW AND APPROVE JUST WHAT
FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM WOULD BE REQUIRED.BRUCE

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